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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3272 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  SYLVESTER ANDREWS, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 92-cr-00671-008) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
August 22, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 5, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Sylvester Andrews, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, petitions for a writ of 
mandamus compelling the District Court to adjudicate his motion pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition. 
 In 1993, Andrews was convicted of federal drug and weapons offenses arising out 
of his participation in a drug-trafficking organization.  Andrews was sentenced to life in 
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prison on the drug offenses, plus a 40-year term of imprisonment based on two violations 
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. 
 In 2001, Andrews filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
The District Court denied the motion because it was untimely filed and we denied 
Andrews’ request for a certificate of appealability.  In 2008, Andrews filed a motion 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  The District Court reduced his life sentence to 360 
months in prison based on amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for crack cocaine 
offenses.  Andrews’ 40-year consecutive sentence was not affected. 
 In 2009, Andrews filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
seeking relief from the denial of his § 2255 motion.  The District Court dismissed the 
motion as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion.  We granted a certificate 
of appealability and, on February 29, 2012, ruled that the District Court had erred 
because Andrews’ motion challenged the District Court’s decision that his § 2255 motion 
was untimely and did not challenge a resolution of the merits of his claims.  We 
remanded the matter to District Court to decide the merits of the Rule 60(b) motion.  See 
C.A. No. 10-2088.
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 This Court’s judgment was filed in District Court on April 23, 2012.  On June 14, 
2012, the District Court issued an order directing the parties to file memoranda 
addressing whether Andrews’ Rule 60(b) motion should be granted.  Both Andrews and 
                                              
1We set forth several questions for the District Court’s consideration on remand, 
including whether Andrews’ innocence under Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 
(1995), with respect to one of his violations of § 924(c) constitutes “extraordinary 
circumstances”  permitting Rule 60(b) relief. 
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the Government filed responses.  On November 1, 2012, the District Court appointed 
Andrews counsel.  The District Court then denied Andrews’ Rule 60(b) motion “without 
prejudice subject to his right to file a counseled Rule 60(b) motion.”  Dist. Ct. Order 
entered 11/28/12.   
 Counsel, however, did not file a Rule 60(b) motion and, on February 7, 2013, 
Andrews filed in District Court a “Notice of Appearance as Pro-se Litigant under Title 28 
U.S.C. § 1654” asking to remove his counsel of record, proceed pro se “with assistance 
of counsel,” and re-instate his pro se filings.  Shortly thereafter, Andrews filed a copy of 
a letter he had sent his court-appointed counsel stating, among other things, that he had 
been unable to reach him and that counsel had not contacted him since his appointment.   
 There was no further docket activity in Andrews’ case until April 16, 2013, when 
Andrews filed a one-sentence “Letter Motion” asking that nothing be submitted to the 
Court on his behalf by any attorney without his approval.  On July 11, 2013, Andrews 
filed another “Notice of Appearance as pro-se Litigant Under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1654” 
again asking to remove his counsel of record, proceed pro se “with assistance of 
counsel,” and re-instate his earlier pro se filings.  Andrews further asked the District 
Court to address the questions set forth in this Court’s earlier decision and the District 
Court’s June 14, 2012 order.  No action has been taken on this filing. 
 Andrews then filed a mandamus petition in this Court asking us to compel the 
District Court to adjudicate his Rule 60(b) motion based on his pro se filings.  Andrews 
states that he has not heard from his court-appointed counsel and that he should not be 
compelled to accept his representation.  Andrews also asks this Court to compel the 
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District Court to rule on matters related to the disposition of his Rule 60(b) motion, 
including an earlier motion for extension of time to file his § 2255 motion.  
 Mandamus relief is available in extraordinary circumstances.  See In re Diet Drugs 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  A petitioner must show that “(1) 
no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to 
issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the 
circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) 
(quotation marks omitted).  A writ of mandamus may be appropriate when a district 
court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.”  Madden v. 
Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  See also Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 
(10th Cir. 1990) (granting writ of mandamus where habeas petition was pending for 14 
months). 
 The District Court acted promptly when this case was remanded, but we agree 
with Andrews that the resolution of his Rule 60(b) motion has been delayed since he was 
appointed counsel on November 28, 2012.  Andrews appears to have tried to call 
attention to the fact that appointed counsel has not filed a Rule 60(b) motion on his behalf 
in his District Court filings in February and July of this year.  We do not find, however, 
that there has been undue delay by the District Court in addressing these filings at this 
point in time.  Andrews’ second “notice,” which explicitly asked for a ruling on the 
questions set forth in our earlier decision, was filed shortly before this mandamus 
petition. 
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 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus without prejudice 
to Andrews filing a new mandamus petition if the District Court does not act on his 
filings within a reasonable time.    
 
